The purpose of this paper is to measure the impact of Robert Parker's oenological grades on Bordeaux wine prices. We study their impact on the so-called en primeur wine prices, i.e., the prices determined by the château owners when the wines are still extremely young. The Parker grades are usually published in the spring of each year, before the wine prices are established.
may leave wines practically unsaleable unless their prices are adjusted downwards. His power over prices is thought to be particularly important for en primeur wines. 3 A possible explanation for this is that consumers do not have easy access to the en primeur market (recall that en primeur wines are not yet bottled). As a consequence they cannot judge the products themselves, and thus require the judgment of wine connoisseurs.
To assess the effect of Parker's opinion on en primeur prices, we exploit the following natural vintage. According to Parker himself, the trip was cancelled at the request of his family. 4 The
French press however argued that his absence could be explained by the judicial affairs in which one his collaborators was involved at the time (see for example Libération, July 1, 2003) . Whatever the reasons, it meant that château owners had to determine their prices without knowing the grades that Parker would have attributed. So, as Jancis Robinson put it, "the Bordelais are having to re-learn the art of selling a whole vintage, 2002, without his help".
5
We use this unusual reversal to estimate a Parker effect on en primeur prices. Adopting the counterfactual framework introduced by Rubin (1974) , this effect is defined as the average treatment effect on the treated. It measures the mean effect of the attribution of Parker grades for those wines that were actually graded. This commonly-used evaluation parameter is identified under a "parallel trend" assumption. Roughly speaking, this assumption states that, had Parker not graded any wine in two subsequent years (which is of course a hypothetical situation), the price evolution over the two years would have been the same for all wines. Under the parallel trend assumption, 3 See the wine survey "The Globe in a Glass" published in The Economist, 18 December 1999, page 102. 4 Early in 2003, his wife and daughter preferred the trip to be postponed in view of the threat of a war in Iraq. 5 See http://www.jancisrobinson.com/jr7046.htm.
the treatment effect can be estimated by a difference-in-differences type estimator. In what is probably the earliest article on the subject, Ginsburgh et al. (1994) apply the hedonic price method to a sample of 102 Médoc wines. Their data set allows them to disentangle the price effects of weather, reputation (as measured by the 1855 classification), natural endowments (soil, exposure of the vineyards or grapes), and all sorts of production factors. They show that technology and weather conditions explain two thirds of the price variation, and once the reputation variable is added the proportion of explained variance increases to almost 85%. They also show that more recent classifications (such as Parker's classification) do not lead to a better fit of the hedonic price equation than the 1855 classification.
Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1996) vintages (1982) (1983) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) to estimate the influence of current quality (as measured by Parker grades and by an overall vintage score given by Wine Spectator ) and reputation (as measured by the ranking of the wine and by the average of the scores Parker gave to previous vintages) on the pricing of en primeur wines. They find that prices mainly depend on the reputation of the châteaux through their ranking. They also find that the marginal impact of Parker grades on en primeur prices is significant but small: a one-point increase in the grade leads to a price increase of 1.01%.
Dubois and Nauges (2005) use a subsample of the Hadj Ali and Nauges (2004) data set (108 châteaux over the 1994-1998 vintages). They argue that true quality, which is known by the producer but unobserved by the consumer and the econometrician, will not only influence the pricing of en primeur wines but also the Parker-rating, implying an endogeneity issue which may produce biased estimates. Controlling for unobserved quality allows them to disentangle the effect of quality from the effect of Parker grades on prices. They find evidence that Parker grades significantly affect the price of en primeur wines: a one-point increase in the grade increases the price by 1.38%. They also show that the impact of Parker's judgment is clearly over-estimated when unobserved quality is not accounted for since in this case it equals 3.95%, which is much larger than the effect found by Hadj Ali and Nauges (2004) using the whole data set.
There are many differences between the previous papers and the present paper, but we will only mention the two most important ones. The first is that most of the previous papers study the marginal impact of Parker grades on prices. We instead focus on the more extreme evaluation parameter "price when wine is graded minus price in the absence of grading". The second difference 
En primeur wine prices
The The en primeur prices are determined by the château owners themselves, and given these prices, the brokers negotiate with potential buyers about quantities, delivery dates, etc... The Bordeaux en primeur market exists since the 18th century and has become increasingly important in recent years. Nowadays it generates a turnover of between 300 and 600 million euros per year, and some châteaux sell up to 80% of their production en primeur (see Hadj Ali (2002)).
The en primeur prices in our data correspond to first tranche prices (also called opening prices) We also observe for each château its appellation group and its ranking.
Since the broker who gave us the price data is a large and important firm in Bordeaux, there is a good reason to believe that our sample is representative of the population of châteaux active in the en primeur market. Evidence for this comes from the fact that the sample covers a large spectrum of châteaux, ranging from the best-known wines such as Ausone, Lafite Rothschild, Latour, Margaux, and Mouton-Rothschild, to less prestigious ones such as Beaulieu, Chantegrive, Fonréaud, Pierdon, etc...
Parker grades
Each spring, usually late March or early April, Robert Parker comes to the Bordeaux region to taste en primeur wines from the latest vintage. Since the wines are not yet bottled, the infantile clarets are extracted from the barrels. The tastings are generally done in peer-group, single-blind conditions. Peer-group tasting means that wines belonging to the same region or appellation are evaluated relatively to each other. Single-blind tasting means that the products are judged without the producer's name being known, which has the advantage that neither the price nor the reputation 7 Château owners sell their wine on the en primeur market in one, two or three tranches. The tranches are sold successively, which allows the producers to eventually adapt prices to market demand. The first tranche prices are by far the most strategic, awaited and scrutinized prices in the en primeur market. 8 A given château is not necessarily traded by the broker in each year. If it is not traded in some year then its en primeur price is obviously not observed in that year. Table 1 shows how the 233 châteaux in our data are ranked and from which appellation they originate. Note that about half of the Bordeaux appellations are represented in our sample (there 9 See the wine reports in The Wine Advocate or his wine books.
Descriptive statistics
are 25 different appellations in the sample, while there are roughly 50 of them in the Bordeaux wine region; see Combris et al. (1997) 10 There is not much variation in the observed intervals. In 91% of the cases the interval is either 1 or 2 points, in 8% it equals 3 points, and in 1% it is either 4 (1 case) or 11 points (1 case). Let P i0 (t) represent the en primeur price for wine i in case it is not graded in the spring of year t (wine i in the control group at t), and let P i1 (t) be the price in case the wine is graded (wine i in the treatment group at t). Finally, let P i (t) be the realized price, i.e., studies (one exception that we are aware of is Heckman et al. (1998) ). We shall do likewise but acknowledge that the assumption may be quite strong in our particular context. Indeed, SUTVA rules out any interference or relationship between observations. SUTVA thus excludes, for instance, that the grading of a particular château influences the wine prices set by other châteaux owners (through general-equilibrium or imitation effects).
A natural definition of the Parker effect for wine i would be the difference P i1 ( (2005)). In our context this parameter is
which is the expected Parker effect for those wines that were graded in 2002.
For what follows, it is useful to give the mean prices and standard errors, for both vintages, according to whether the wines are in the control or treatment group in 2002. This is done in Table   3 . Table 3 Table 3 shows, the estimate is 12.27). The restriction is, however, very strong in our context as Parker is more likely to grade the prestigious high-quality wines than the low-quality wines. In the absence of treatment, the expected wine price is therefore probably higher in the treatment group than in the control group. Indirect evidence for this selectivity bias comes from Table 3 Fortunately the AT ET is also identified under the following, much weaker, "parallel trend"
Restriction (2) 
An estimate of the AT ET can be obtained by replacing the expectations in (3) by the corresponding sample averages given in Table 3 .
The second expectation can still be estimated by taking the difference of appropriate sample means, and the first expectation can be estimated using kernel estimation methods. We have
where for g beyond 94. This is due to the fact that there are very few observations in this range of the sample. The problem could not be resolved by using a variable bandwidth. We therefore dropped 3 extreme observations from the sample, and our estimate is thus based on N 1 (2002) = 155, and using this sample we find h = 0.734. Figure 1 shows the graph of AT ET (g) together with the 95% point-wise confidence band. 17 The estimates of AT ET (g) tend to increase with the grade, starting around zero for g = 84.5 and the maximum is around 14 euros for g = 93.5. Note that the null hypothesis "AT ET (g) = 0" is accepted for grades below 86, but is rejected for grades beyond that value. The fact that the more highly graded wines benefit relatively more from being evaluated by 16 We have also calculated estimates of AT ET (g) by drawing each grade randomly in its corresponding grade interval, but the resulting graphs were very similar to the ones reported below. 17 The 95% point-wise confidence band is constructed using the bootstrap method described in Härdle (1990, pp. 103-106). Details can be obtained from the authors. Table 2 ), and this is still in the range of wines judged by Parker as "barely above average to very good" (wines with scores between 80 and 89 fall in this category, see The Wine Advocate). In other words, had Parker also evaluated châteaux with quality levels well below this range, we might have found AT ET (g) to be negative for scores in the 50s ("unacceptable" wines), the 60s ("below average" wines), or may be even the 70s ("average" wines). Table 2 ), and assume that these grades coincide with the ones Parker would have given in the spring. We argued in Section 3 that this is a reasonable assumption. Let of the grade/price curve is steeper for predicted prices than for actual prices, and the gap between the two curves increases from less than 1 euro for g = 86 to about 14 euros for g = 93.5.
18 As Table 2 
